PARrICLE BEAM WEAPONS By: Liao Xianwng

PARrICLE BEAM WEAPONS
By: Liao Xianwng

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a114383.pdf

Particle beam weapons are actually miniaturized particle
accelerators used for military purposes. They possess
advantages over other antimissile devices even including
laser weapons. To avert the danger of falling behind, both
the Soviet Union and the United States have stepped up
development in their efforts to turn particle beam weapons
into both strategic defense weapons and in-space offensive
weapons.
One day in November 1975 an American reconnaissance satellite carrying all
kinds of reconnaissance equipment was quietly watching the world turn. Suddenly,
overhead Semipalatinsk in the Central Asian part of the Soviet Union, it
detected fission products of a suspected nuclear explosion. Actually, the
Soviet Union had not carried out an underground nuclear test that day, and nor
had they carried out a nuclear test in the atmosphere either. Continued
reconnaissance detected more than seven or eight repetitions of this unusual
phenomenon. It was not quite the coincidence it seemed. At that time US
military intelligence experts were seriously concerned. Subsequently, after
further intense and close reconnaissance, they came to the conclusion, after
repeated deliberations, that this appearance of nuclear explosion protons could
be evidence that the Soviet Union was carrying out research into the use of
particle beam weapons. They also discovered that the Soviets were carrying
out various experimental activities all associated with particle beam weapons.
In recent years, news reports in the Western press on the subject of this
kind of particle beam weapon have been of two different opinions. One opinion
considers them to be a type of mysterious weapon that destroys targets at the
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speed of light, an unrivalled defensive weapon device with fast response time,
great accuracy and a thousand times better precision than the present antimissile
systems. This opinion also considers that the Soviet Union has made
breakthroughs in the field of particle beam technology which will allow them
to be well ahead of the United States in deploying particle beam weapons in
the early 1980s. This would therefore obsolete US strategic weapons. This is
casting a cloud over the US development of strategic weapons and has spurred
the US into stepping up the pace of developing particle beam weapons. An ,
alternative view considers the technologies indispensible to particle beam
weapons to be many. These technologies are complicated and for the time being
are presenting a number of problems that are proving difficult to overcome.
There is no chance of either the Soviet Union or the United States developing
a viable weapon system from particle beam technology in the near future.

Information on Directed Energy Programs for Fiscal Years 1985 Through 1993 

https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/153504.pdf

since 1985 sdi has been developing technologies for directed energy weapons-lasers and particle
beams. (On May 13,1993, the Secretary of Defense changed the name of
the Strategic Defense Initiative program and office to Ballistic Missile
Defense.) Prior to 1986, other Department of Defense agencies and
services had been developing the technologies. It was believed they could
be the most effective means of defeating the evolving Soviet
intercontinental ballistic missile threat that included thousands of nuclear
warheads and decoys. The priority of SDIO'S directed energy weapon
research and development programs decreased following the breakup of
the former Soviet Union in 1990 and the 1991 refocusing of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) by President Bush, In 1992, the Congress directed
that far-term technology programs (such as directed energy) be
transferred from SDIO to the Advanced Research Projects Agency or the
appropriate military department unless national security interests dictated
their retention.
The Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, House
Committee on Government Operations, asked GAO to assist the Congress in
evaluating the Department of Defense’s recommendations for transferring
or retaining management responsibility for directed energy technologies in
SD10 and in determining the future direction of directed energy
development. GAO was asked to provide information on the funding of the
directed energy programs to date, the development status of the
technologies, and the additional funding that would be needed for further
development of the technologies.

Production of Neutral Beams from Negative Ion Beam Systems in the USSR

Production of Neutral Beams from Negative Ion Beam Systems in the USSR 

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R2909.1.pdf

Neutral Particle Beam [NPB]

Neutral Particle Beam [NPB]

https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/npb.htm

Contrasted to charged particle beams, neutral particle beams have several inherent properties that make them very attractive for space based applications. In particular, high energy neutral particles propagate in straight lines unaffected by the earth's magnetic field and have a very brief flight time to targets even at extended ranges. In addition, the neutral particles become high energy charged particles upon interaction with the surface of a target and penetrate deeply into the vehicle, thus making shielding relatively ineffective. In the case of a nuclear warhead, these particles are capable of heating the nuclear material by fission processes, neutron generation and ionization. For non-nuclear material, heating is produced by ionization, possibly producing kill by thermal initation of the weapon's high explosive.

 Thus, interest in space based systems was revitalized when experiments, at the Los Alamos Clinton P. Anderson Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF), on the proton linear accelerator showed several orders of magnitude improvement in accelerator performance. Extensive measurements of beam properties at energies of 211 and 500 MeV showed that the energy spread of the beam was better than 0.5% and the emittance of the beam was better than 0.66pcm-mrad. In addition, the LAMPF accelerator was used to accelerate H - ions to energies above 100 MeV and, as expected, their behavior is similar to that of protons. These achievements prompted Knapp and NcNally to write a LASL report titled SIPAPU Rpt. LA-5642-MS, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, July 1974, in which they proposed a satellite-based high energy neutral hydrogen weapon. An intense, high quality beam of H - ions is generated and accelerated to an energy of approximately 250 MeV. After acceleration the beam is expanded, and passed through final focusing and steering magnets. The beam is subsequently neutralized by stripping the weakly bound electron from the H - ion and the resulting hydrogen beam propagates toward the target unaffected by the earth's magnetic fields. Both the system and the target must remain above approximately 250 kilometers in order to minimize the beam degradation by collisions with residual gases.
 Improvements in the state of the art for producing intense high quality ion beams, for lightweight efficient accelerators, for high current negative ion beams stripper techniques without excessive scattering, and for compact lightweight power systems are necessary before this device can be considered viable. Methods for neutral beam detection, signatures for closed loop tracking and kill assessment, and techniques for rapidly steering the beam over large angles are also needed.
Although, there are many of these practicle issues to be considered, there did not appear, in principle, to be any inherent limitations that deem the device inviable. But the solutions for the neutralization of the H - ion beams all had serious adverse systems implications. Once the H - beam has been accelerated, aimed, and focused on the target it can be neutralized. This can be accomplished by a number of techniques. For example, photo detachment, a plasma or gas stripping have been considered. Photo detachment causes less degradation in beam quality and can result in the largest friction of the ion beam being converted to a neutral beam. Unfortunately, extremely high energy cw lasers at wavelengths that are not currently available are required for this purpose, and, even if they become available, they would probably be as large and as expensive as the rest of the system. Since open-ended plasma strippers with quiescent plasmas cause less beam degradation than a gas stripper they have also been considered; but, because of the necessity of allowing the plasma to escape, the power requirement for the plasma stripper alone in equal to or greater than that for the rest of the system. Also, it is problematical that a sufficiently quiescent plasma could be produced. Therefore, considerable work both theoretical and experimental has been devoted to the development of a gas stripper. The fractions of the initial beam which survives as H - , which is stripped to H o , and which is stripped to H + is given as a function of the stripper thickness. As a result of this work a gas stripper was included in the SIPAPU system.

Sipapu was named after a Native American word said to mean "sacred fire", but then altered to protect ethnic sensibilities. Sipapu is the place of emergence from the underworld (where the spirits and ancestors of the Hopi live). The passage between the World Below and the earth is the sipapu. The Grand Canyon, which is the Hopi Sipapu or Emergence Hole, and it is where legend says the Hopi came up from the under world. In Hopi mythology, Sipapu is the entryway through which all souls must enter and exit the spirit world. The circular kivas found in Anasazi ruins are said to be symbolic of this emergence, i.e. underground ceremonial chambers with a roof entrance/exit, called the sipapu. The tepali, the ritual hole covered by a stone disc at the center of the tuki, is a variant of the sipapu (Hopi sipaapuni), the mythical place of emergence of the Pueblo peoples, which is architecturally represented as a hole in the center of the kiva. For the Army, Sipapu was a neutral beam, space-based weapon, ranked second in priority to Chair Heritage and is receiving in excess of $10 million in 1980. This Army program, being conducted at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico, is based on advanced Soviet technology demonstrated in a Russian-designed plasma generating device. The US version was tested to determine compatibility with a Meson Physics Accelerator, located at Los Alamos. The two devices were coupled to form a test apparatus for follow-on experiments on beam propagation and lethality. The Sipapu program reached a stage where weapons packaging designs could be initiated. If Sipapu were developed in a less sophisticated, antisatellite configuration, it could be launched in three to five years with adequate funding.

In its 1984 directed energy plan, SDIO planned to build a space-based neutral particle beam (NPB) and test it on the ground by the end of fiscal year 1992 at an estimated cost of $747 million through fiscal year 1989. Through fiscal year 1993, SDIO allocated $794 million to this program and it had not completed all of the ground and space tests included in the 1984 plan. SDIO estimated in 1993 that it would take 4 more years and $421 million to complete the ground and space testing and the development of a lightweight power source for NPB (power source for NPB was initially to be developed under another program). These actions would exceed the objectives included in the 1984 plan. At that point, SD10 could decide whether to propose entering the demonstration and validation phase of development and doing an integrated system level demonstration.

According to SDIO's 1984 plan, NPB development was to have advanced by 1992 to a point enabling a decision on whether to fund an integrated system level demonstration in space. As a basis for this decision, SDIO planned to have demonstrated beam generation/conditioning feasibility and scalability with an accelerator, lightweight magnetic optics for steering the beam, concepts for sensing the beam and boresighting it, propagation of a beam from a spacecraft into a space environment, feasibility of growth technology that could provide higher brightness beams, and integration on the ground of key subsystems of a space-based NPB weapon.

The plan specified that about $747 million would be required from fiscal years 1986 through 1989 to achieve these objectives. The power system and the ATP system for NPB were to be developed under separate programs. Four of the 1984 program plan's eight major objectives for NPB had been completed by 1993. SDIO said that significant progress had been made on completing the other four. Through fiscal year 1993, SD10 spent about $794 million to develop NPB, or $47 million more than it estimated was needed for fiscal years 1986 through 1989 to do the planned research.

SDIO'S 1984 program goals were to generate a particle beam in the burst mode with a power of 50-million electron volts and a beam in the continuous mode with a power of 5 million electron volts. The 50-million electron volt goal was replaced in 1987 by a 24 million electron volt goal. SD10 said the change was prompted by concept studies that indicated the 24 million electron volt experiment would demonstrate the requisite weapon relevant objectives. SDIO said that considerable progress has been made toward achieving these goals. Final completion of the 1984 goals will occur with operation of the beamline components that are now fabricated and being installed on the Ground Test Accelerator and the continuous wave deuterium demonstrator.

The Ground Test Accelerator at Los Alamos National Laboratory produced a 3.2~million electron volt beam in the burst mode by 1993. Additional components to increase the accelerator's beam energy to 24 million electron volts were added to the accelerator. 1, SDIO plans to perform the 24 million electron volt demonstration during fiscal year 1994, which accomplished the first objective. According to SDIO, the results of this demonstration were scalable to higher levels.

The continuous wave deuterium demonstrator, located at Argonne National Laboratory, was used to demonstrate the continuous operation of a particle beam accelerator to produce a beam with an energy of up to 7 million electron volts. This demonstration will address not only issues related to the continuous operation of an accelerator such as cryogenic operation and thermal management but also the use of deuterium particles to enhance lethality. Over 90 percent of the hardware needed for this accelerator had been fabricated by 1993. SDIO completed this demonstration during fiscal year 1994.

SD10 developed lightweight foil neutralizers for stripping the electrons from hydrogen or deuterium ions to produce a beam of neutral atoms. Neutral atoms are unaffected by magnetic fields, so once accelerated and pointed at a target, they will proceed in a straight line. Foil neutralizers are lightweight, have no power requirements, and have been fabricated to weapon-level size.

A lightweight magnetic beam-expander telescope has been developed to focus and control the size of the beam at the target, In addition, a weapon level beam sensing technology has been developed and tested to sense the direction in which the neutral beam is pointed. The beam sensor can detect the direction of the beam at a very precise level and make corrections to ensure the beam is properly directed at the target.

SDIO reported that NPB'S primary mission, interactive discrimination, requires that detectors be developed and placed on a separate space platform to detect the emissions induced when the beam penetrates targets. This data is needed so NPB cm determine the mass of the target or assess the extent of damage to the target if NPB is used to destroy missiles. SD10 has investigated several different detector technologies such as multiwire proportional counter detectors, scintillating fiber optics, advanced ionization chambers, and solid state silicon detectors. The multiwire proportional counter detector and the scintillating fiber optics are the preferred concepts because of their proven operational capabilities and low sensitivity to gamma rays. Detector modules based on these technologies have been developed and are scalable to weapon level specifications.

The 1984 program plan objectives for resolving issues related to operating an NPB in space have been partially completed by three experiments. In 1989, SDIO completed a suborbital NPB space experiment, called Beam Experiment Aboard Rocket, at a cost of about $60 million at the White Sands Missile Range. This experiment achieved its primary objective of generating an NPB in space and its secondary objective of resolving a number of space physics issues that were potential obstacles to operating an NPB in space. The second experiment, the Army Background Experiment, successfully measured the natural neutron background of the earth with a neutron detector module developed for NPB applications. The third experiment consisted of three separate shuttle-based space experiments of neutralizer material interactions with atomic oxygen and the space environment. SDIO said the neutralizer material was not adversely affected by the space environment.

SDI0 also spent about $78 million planning another space experiment, called the integrated space experiment, which was to be a shuttle launched experiment to demonstrate NPB technologies on-orbit. This experiment, however, was canceled in 1988 because it was too expensive and the NPB technology was not mature enough to support the specified performance.

A complete NPB system must be demonstrated in space to resolve the space-related technology problems, The space demonstration is to determine the system's ability to propagate a beam to distant targets and is to also resolve other issues such as spacecraft charging, atomic oxygen effects, and control of effluents. By 1993 SDIO was considering two options for the space experiment: an experiment called far-field optics experiment and a larger experiment called Lunar Resource Mapper. The far-field optics experiment would cost about $260 million and could be launched on a Delta II vehicle and completed in 4 years. According to SDIO, the Lunar Resource Mapper experiment was of greater interest to the scientific community due to its ability to identify mineral resources on celestial bodies at much higher geographic resolution than possible with passive means.

SDIO developed a lightweight system to provide the power needed for the space platform. Such a power system must be capable of providing 20 kilowatts of housekeeping power on a long-term basis as well as megawatt levels of burst power to operate the NPB during a battle. SDI0 estimates in 1993 that it would cost $40 million to complete this program.

AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES (MOON AGREEMENT)

AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES (MOON AGREEMENT)
http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/agreement-governing-activities-states-moon-and-other-celestial-bodies-moon-agreement/ Overview
Opened for signature: 18 December 1979
Entered into force: 11 July 1984
Signatories: 5 States — France, Guatemala, India, Peru & Romania
Depositary: UN Secretary-General
10 Member States — (including) Australia, Austria, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines and Uruguay.
Treaty Text
The Moon Agreement was signed in December 1979 following an initiative by the Soviet Union. On 5 December 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the Agreement in resolution 34/68.

Treaty Obligations
The Moon Agreement supplements the Outer Space Treaty and confirmed the demilitarization of the Moon and other celestial bodies as provided for in that treaty. The Agreement also prohibits the use or threat of use of force, or any other hostile action or threat of hostile action on the Moon, which is reserved exclusively for peaceful activities. It prohibits the use of the Moon in order to commit any hostile act or to engage in any such threat in relation to the Earth, the Moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft, or man-made space objects. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around the Moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the Moon.

The agreement forbids the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications on the Moon and, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers on the Moon. But the use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes is not prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration and use of the Moon is not prohibited.

States Parties are committed to inform the UN Secretary-General as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of their activities concerned with the exploration and use of the Moon. Information on the time, purposes, locations, orbital parameters, and duration is to be given in respect of each mission to the Moon as soon as possible after launching, while information on the results of each mission, including scientific results, shall be furnished upon completion of the mission. In the case of a mission lasting more than 60 days, information on conduct of the mission, including any scientific results, is to be given periodically, at 30-day intervals. For missions lasting more than six months, only significant additions to such information need be reported thereafter.

As reflected in the provisions of this Agreement the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind. The Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or its natural resources, can become the property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity, or of any natural person. The placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the surface of the Moon, including structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the Moon or any areas thereof.

Verification and Compliance
Verification
Each State Party may assure itself that the activities of other States Parties in the exploration and use of the Moon are compatible with the provisions of this Agreement. To this end, all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations on the Moon shall be open to other States Parties. Such States Parties shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, so that appropriate consultations may be held and maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited. Any State Party may act on its own behalf or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the UN Charter.

Compliance
A State Party which has reason to believe that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Agreement or that another State Party is interfering with the rights which the former State Party has under this Agreement may request consultations with that State Party. A State Party receiving such a request shall enter into such consultations without delay. Any other State Party that requests to do so shall be entitled to take part in the consultations. Each State Party participating in such consultations shall seek a mutually acceptable resolution of any controversy and shall bear in mind the rights and interests of all States Parties. The UN Secretary-General shall be informed of the results of the consultations and shall transmit the information received to all States Parties concerned.

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. 
https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/publications/studyseries/en/SS-34.pdf

This print publication has been issued in implementation of the United Nations
Disarmament Information Programme as a reference tool containing the report of the
Secretary-General on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.
This publication contains the report of the Secretary-General and additional material
related to the publication of the report. The views expressed in the experts’ papers, published
in unedited form, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United
Nations.

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities

http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Resources/Factsheets/ICOCDraft_31March2014.pdf

VERSION 31 March 2014

DRAFT

International Code of Conduct

for Outer Space Activities

Preamble

The Subscribing States

1 • In order to safeguard the continued peaceful and sustainable use of outer space

for current and future generations, and in a spirit of greater international

cooperation, collaboration, openness and transparency;

2 • Considering that the activities of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful

purposes play a key role in the social, economic, scientific and technological

development of all nations, in the management of global issues such as the

preservation of the environment and disaster management;

3 • Further recognising that space activities and capabilities, including associated

ground and space segments and supporting links, are vital to national security

and to the maintenance of international peace and security;

4 • Noting that all States, both space-faring and non-spacefaring, should actively

contribute to the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation

relating to these activities;

5 • Recognising the need for the widest possible adherence to relevant existing

international instruments that promote the peaceful exploration and use of outer

space;

6 • Noting the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7 • Recalling the increasing importance of outer space transparency and confidence-

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building measures in light of the growing use of outer space by governmental

and non-governmental entities;

8 • Taking into account that space debris affects the sustainable use of outer space,

constitutes a hazard to outer space activities and potentially limits the effective

deployment and utilisation of associated outer space capabilities; 

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(hereinafter referred to as the "Code"):

17 I. Purpose, Scope and General Principles

18 1. Purpose and Scope

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1.1. The purpose of this Code is to enhance the safety, security, and sustainability of

all outer space activities pertaining to space objects, as well as the space

environment.

20

1.2. This Code addresses outer space activities involving all space objects launched

into Earth orbit or beyond, conducted by a Subscribing State, or jointly with other

States, or by non-governmental entities under the jurisdiction of a Subscribing State,

including those activities conducted within the framework of international

intergovernmental organisations.

21 1.3. This Code establishes transparency and confidence-building measures, with the

aim of enhancing mutual understanding and trust, helping both to prevent

confrontation and foster national, regional and global security and stability, and is

complementary to the international legal framework regulating outer space

activities.

22 1.4. Subscription to this Code is open to all States, on a voluntary basis. This Code

is not legally binding, and is without prejudice to applicable international and

national law.

23 2. General Principles

24 The Subscribing States decide to abide by the following principles:

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• the freedom for all States, in accordance with international law and obligations,

to access, to explore, and to use outer space for peaceful purposes without

harmful interference, fully respecting the security, safety and integrity of space

objects, and consistent with internationally accepted practices, operating

procedures, technical standards and policies associated with the long-term 

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sustainability of outer space activities, including, inter alia, the safe conduct of

outer space activities;

26 • the responsibility of states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner

inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the

inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defence as recognised in

the Charter of the United Nations;

27 • the responsibility of States to take all appropriate measures and cooperate in

good faith to avoid harmful interference with outer space activitie

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(1972);

35 • the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975);

36 • the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union

and its Radio Regulations, as amended;

37 • the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space

and under Water (1963) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

(1996).

38 (b) Declarations, principles, recommendations and guidelines, including:

39 • International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as adopted by

the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) Resolution 1721 (December

1961);

40 • the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the

Exploration and Use of Outer Space as adopted by UNGA Resolution 1962

(XVIII) (1963);

41 • the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space as

adopted by UNGA Resolution 47/68 (1992) and the Safety Framework for

Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space as endorsed by UNGA

Resolution 64/86 (2010);

42 • the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of

Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into

Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries as adopted by

UNGA Resolution 51/122 (1996);

43 • the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002),

as endorsed in UNGA Resolutions 59/91 (2004), 60/62 (2005), 63/64 (2008),

65/73 (2010) and 67/42 (2012);

44 • the Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International 

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Intergovernmental Organisations in Registering Space Objects as endorsed by

UNGA Resolution 62/101 (2007);

45 • the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as endorsed by UNGA Resolution 62/217 (2007).

46 3.2. The Subscribing States resolve to promote the development of guidelines for

outer space operations within the appropriate international fora, such as the UN

Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Conference on Disarmament,

for the purpose of promoting the safety and security of outer space operations and

the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

47 II. Safety, Security and Sustainability of Outer Space Activities

48 4. Measures on Outer Space Operations and Space Debris Mitigation

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4.1. The Subscribing States resolve to establish and implement policies and

procedures to minimise the risk of accidents in space, collisions between space

objects, or any form of harmful interference with another State’s peaceful

exploration, and use, of outer space.

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4.2. The Subscribing States resolve, in conducting outer space activities, to:

51 • refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or

destruction, of space objects unless such action is justified:

o by imperative safety considerations, in particular if human life or health

is at risk; or

o in order to reduce the creation of space debris; or

o by the Charter of the United Nations, including the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defence.

and where such exceptional action is necessary, that it be undertaken in a manner so

as to minimise, to the greatest extent practicable, the creation of space debris; 

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52 • take appropriate measures to minimize the risk of collision; and

53 • improve adherence to, and implementation of, International Telecommunication

Union regulations on allocation of radio spectra and space services, and on

addressing harmful radio-frequency interference.

54 4.3. In order to minimise the creation of space debris and to mitigate its impact in

outer space, the Subscribing States resolve to limit, to the greatest extent practicable,

any activities in the conduct of routine space operations, including during the launch

and the entire orbital lifetime of a space object, which may generate long-lived

space debris.

55 4.4. To that purpose, they resolve to adopt and implement, in accordance with their

own internal processes, the appropriate policies and procedures or other effective

measures in order to implement the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the

United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as endorsed by

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217 (2007).

56 III. Cooperation Mechanisms

57 5. Notification of Outer Space Activities

58

5.1. The Subscribing States, guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual

assistance, resolve to notify, in a timely manner, to the greatest extent practicable,

all potentially affected States of any event related to the outer space activities they

are conducting which are relevant for the purposes of this Code, including:

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• scheduled manoeuvres that could pose a risk to the safety of flight of the space

objects of other States;

60 • predicted conjunctions posing an apparent on-orbit collision risk, due to natural

orbital motion, between space objects or between space objects and space

debris;

61 • pre-notification of launch of space objects; 

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62 • collisions, break-ups in orbit, and any other destruction of a space object(s)

which have taken place generating measurable orbital debris;

63 • predicted high-risk re-entry events in which the re-entering space object or

residual material from the re-entering space object potentially could cause

significant damage or radioactive contamination;

64 • malfunctioning of space objects or loss of control that could result in a

significantly increased probability of a high risk re-entry event or a collision

between space objects.

65 5.2. The Subscribing States resolve to provide the notifications on any event related

to the outer space activities described above to all potentially affected States:

66 • through the Central Point of Contact to be established under section 9; or

67 • through diplomatic channels; or

68 • by any other method as may be mutually determined by the Subscribing States.

69 In notifying the Central Point of Contact, the Subscribing States should identify, if

applicable, the potentially affected States.

70 The Central Point of Contact should ensure the timely distribution of the

notifications received.

71 6. Information on Outer Space Activities

72 6.1. The Subscribing States resolve to share, on an annual basis, where available

and appropriate, information with the other Subscribing States on:

73

• their space strategies and policies, including those which are security-related, in

all aspects which could affect the safety, security, and sustainability in outer

space;

74 • their major outer space research and space applications programmes;

75 • their space policies and procedures to prevent and minimise the possibility of 

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accidents, collisions or other forms of harmful interference and the creation of

space debris; and

76 • efforts taken in order to promote universal adoption and adherence to legal and

political regulatory instruments concerning outer space activities.

77 6.2. The Subscribing States may also consider providing timely information on outer

space environmental conditions and forecasts collected through their space

situational awareness capabilities, including in particular on natural phenomena that

may pose a hazard to spacecraft, to relevant governmental and non-governmental

entities of other Subscribing States.

78 6.3. Subscribing States, particularly those with relevant space capabilities and with

programmes for the exploration and use of outer space, should contribute to

promoting and fostering international cooperation in outer space activities, giving

particular attention to the benefit for and the interests of developing countries. Each

Subscribing State is free to determine the nature of its participation in international

space cooperation on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis with regard to the

legitimate rights and interests of parties concerned, for example, appropriate

technology safeguard arrangements, multilateral commitments and relevant

standards and practices.

79 6.4. The Subscribing States endeavour to organise on a voluntary basis, to the extent

feasible and practicable, and consistent with national and international law, and

obligations, including non-proliferation commitments, activities to familiarize other

Subscribing States with their programs, policies, and procedures related to the

exploration and use of outer space, including:

• familiarisation visits to improve understanding of a State's policies and

procedures for outer space activities;

• expert visits to space launch sites, flight control centres, and other outer space

infrastructure facilities;

• observations of launches of space objects; 

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• demonstrations of rocket and other space-related technologies, in line with

existing multilateral commitments and export control regulations;

• dialogues to clarify information on outer space activities; and

• thematic workshops and conferences on the exploration and use of outer space.

80 7. Consultation Mechanism

81 7.1. Without prejudice to existing consultation mechanisms provided for in Article

IX of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and in the relevant provisions of the ITU

Constitution and Radio Regulations, the Subscribing States resolve to implement the

following consultation mechanism:

82

• A Subscribing State or States that may be directly affected by certain outer space

activities conducted by another Subscribing State or States and has reason to

believe that those activities are, or may be contrary to this Code may request

consultations with a view to achieving mutually acceptable solutions regarding

measures to be adopted in order to prevent or minimise the potential significant

risks of damage to persons or property, or of harmful interference to a

Subscribing State’s outer space activities.

83 • The Subscribing States involved in a consultation process resolve to:

84 o consult through diplomatic channels or by other methods as may be

mutually determined; and

85 o work jointly and cooperatively in a timeframe sufficiently urgent to

mitigate or eliminate the identified risk initially triggering the

consultations.

86 • Any other Subscribing State or States which has or have reason to believe that

its or their outer space activities would be directly affected by the identified risk

may take part in the consultations if it or they request so, with the consent of the

Subscribing State or States which requested consultations and the Subscribing 

11

State or States which received the request.

87 • The Subscribing States participating in the consultations resolve to seek

mutually acceptable solutions in accordance with international law.

88 7.2. In addition, Subscribing States may propose to create, on a voluntary and caseby-case

basis, missions to analyse specific incidents affecting space objects, based

on objective information, with a view to draw lessons for the future. These missions,

to be established by consensus by the Meeting of the Subscribing States and carried

out by a geographically representative group of experts, endorsed by the involved

Subscribing States, should utilise information provided on a voluntary basis by the

Subscribing States, subject to applicable laws and regulations. The findings and any

recommendations would be of an advisory nature and could be shared, with the

consent of the Subscribing States involved, with other Subscribing States.

89 IV. Organisational Aspects

90 8. Meeting of Subscribing States

91

8.1. The Subscribing States decide to hold regular meetings annually to define,

review and further develop this Code and facilitate its implementation. Additional

meetings may be held if decided by consensus of the Subscribing States at previous

meetings or as communicated through the Central Point of Contact.

The agenda of such meetings could include:

• review of the implementation of the Code;

• modification of the Code;

• discussion of additional measures which may be necessary, including those due

to advances in the development of space technologies and their application; and

• establishing procedures regarding the exchange of notifications and other

information in the framework of the Code.

92 8.2. The decisions at such meetings, both substantive and procedural, are to be taken

by consensus of the Subscribing States present. Decisions with regard to any 

12

modification of the Code taken at such meetings are to apply after written consent is

received by the Central point of Contact via diplomatic note from all Subscribing

States.

93 8.3. At the end of each regular meeting the Subscribing States are to elect by

consensus their Chair for the period until the end of the next regular meeting.

The chair of the first meeting is to be elected at the beginning of this meeting.

94 8.4. The Subscribing States may decide to submit the outcomes of the Meeting of

Subscribing States to the attention of relevant international fora including the United

Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the

Conference on Disarmament, according to their rules of procedure.

95 9. Central Point of Contact

96 9.1. A Central Point of Contact is to be designated by the Subscribing States at the

first Meeting of the Subscribing States and tasked with:

97

• receiving and communicating notifications that a State subscribes to the Code;

98 • serving as a mechanism to facilitate communication of information exchanged

under the Code to all Subscribing States;

99 • serving as secretariat at the Meetings of Subscribing States;

100 • maintaining an electronic database and communications system;

101 • exercising organisational functions in connection with the preparation and

implementation of familiarisation activities referred to in section 6.4., if and to

the extent requested by Subscribing States involved; and

102 • carrying out other tasks as decided by the Meeting of the Subscribing States.

103 9.2. The Subscribing States resolve to create an electronic database and

communications system, which would be used to:

104 • collect and disseminate notifications and information submitted in accordance 

13

with this Code; and

105 • serve as a mechanism to channel requests for consultations.

106 9.3. The electronic database is to be used exclusively in the interests of the

Subscribing States.

107 9.4. In implementing the Code of Conduct, the Subscribing States and the Central

Point of Contact shall endeavour to make the best use of existing facilities and

available services.

108 10. Participation by Regional Integration Organisations and International

Intergovernmental Organisations

109 In this Code, references to Subscribing States are intended to apply, upon their

subscription to the Code:

110

• To any regional integration organisation which has competences over matters

covered by this Code, without prejudice to the competences of its member

States.

111 • With the exception of Sections 8.2 and 8.3: To any international

intergovernmental organisation which conducts outer space activities

if a majority of the States members of the organisation are Subscribing States to

this Code.

THE NEW U.S. APPROACH TO THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY: WILL DELETION OF A VERIFICATION REGIME PROVIDE A WAY OUT OF THE WILDERNESS?

THE NEW U.S. APPROACH TO THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY: WILL DELETION OF A VERIFICATION REGIME PROVIDE A WAY OUT OF THE WILDERNESS?

https://www.jlab.org/conferences/doecaa/talks/Jonas.pdf

this is illegal,

Nuclear proliferation and the concomitant potential for nuclear terrorism, is the greatest threat to the United States in the twenty-first century (actually it to the whole world, and the threat is coming mainly from america not to it). President Kennedy’s remarks, prescient as they were, did not foresee the threat from non-state actors and their quest for nuclear weapons. America (the world), must do all it can to prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear capability. (and illegitimate governments and private corporations) Unfortunately, the United States has no choice in the matter. (lies, we always have  choice), Indeed, as Leon Trotsky once said, “you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Potential terrorist acquisition of nuclear capability, confounds a guiding principle of international relations since the Peace of Westphalia, roughly four hundred years ago, when the nation-state system emerged in Europe. The principle is that only another state, with its power of vast armies and navies, could threaten or harm another state. Today, a few terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon, or other weapons of mass destruction, (WMD supplied by shady government agencies), can pose a threat equal to or greater than the military might, a sovereign state can summon. No other device can compare to the power of a nuclear weapon, to inflict unfathomable destruction. Other WMD, such as chemical or biological weapons, horrific as they are, seem less threatening by comparison. All WMD can destroy human life, livestock and animal life, and crops. But only nuclear weapons also destroy buildings and physical infrastructure, and do so on a vast scale  :(

SPACE SECURITY 2003

SPACE SECURITY 2003

this is written by an american DOD specialist and pretty much most of the things in this pdf are illegal see page 169 for how they plant to get around the treaties, by claiming they are anti satellite devices 

http://spacesecurityindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SSI2003.pdf

Published in Washington, DC © The Eisenhower Institute 2004

SBSWs devoted to ballistic missile defense missions will likely rely upon satellites deployed in GEO to provide target information and early warning of ballistic missile launches.

Mass-to-target SBSWs would cause damage by colliding with targets with the combined mass and velocity of the space-based weapon itself or by impacting targets with inert or explosive devices.

SBSW development could potentially legitimate attacks on space assets and encourage the development of anti-satellite weapons.

Energy-to-target SBSWs cause damage by transferring energy through a beam focused on a target. This could include, for example, space-based lasers, microwaves, or neutral particle beams.

Space based strike weapons (SBSWs) would operate from earth orbit with the capability to damage terrestrial targets (land, sea, or air) or terrestrially launched objects passing through space, via the projection of mass or energy.

International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons

International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons

https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/international-legal-agreements#.WrkjqIjwZPY

The military utility of space has long been recognized and exploited. In fact, the reconnaissance, navigation, and communications functions of space assets are critical to war-making and peacekeeping missions of the US military. However, states have so far resisted positioning destructive weapons in space or intentionally destroying the space assets of other states. Recent policy and planning documents of the United States suggest that strategic control of space is a priority of the current administration and that anti-satellite weapons are an important component of this plan. Also, the administration's national missile defense (NMD) agenda includes space-based NMD systems, which will likely be useful ASAT systems as well.

Strong and almost unanimous opposition to weaponization of space has been expressed in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. China and Russia have drafted text for a treaty to ban space weapons. The United States, however, has refused to enter negotiations on such a treaty.

It is likely that the weaponization of space will begin in the foreseeable future unless it is hindered by organized, effective international opposition or the current US administration is replaced by an administration willing to cancel projects for weaponization of space in the face of considerable opposition from domestic proponents of weaponization.

Although no comprehensive treaty about space weapons is in effect, a legal framework does exist. To help frame this opposition, we review relevant international treaties that address aspects of the space weapons issue and discuss relevant United Nations resolutions.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty entered into effect in October 1967. It is the second "nonarmament" treaty (the first being the Antarctic Treaty of 1961). There is no expiration date.

The first three articles of the treaty set general principles for the use of space; the rest of the articles are intended to guide the behavior of treaty parties.

Article I

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.

Article II

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

Article III

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It also prohibits the testing and the deployment of any kind of weapon on the moon or other celestial bodies.

Article IV

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

While Article IV bans WMD from orbit, it does not prohibit missile-borne WMD from transiting space or weapons other than WMD being placed in space orbit and used to attack targets in space or on Earth. There is no ban on air-, ground-, or conventional space-based anti-satellite or anti-missile weapons.

Article VI touches on the important point that States Parties to the Treaty are responsible for the national activities carried out by corporations and any other non-governmental agencies of that nation. In the context of the potential weaponization of space, Article VI provides a legal context within which actions may be challenged if they are perceived by other States Parties to the Treaty as non-peaceful uses of space.

Articles VII and IX also present possibilities for legal action in connection with space weaponization.

Article VII makes treaty parties that launch objects into outer space liable for damage to the property of another treaty party; the procedure is spelled out in the Liability Convention of 1972. The Liability Convention foresees the establishment of a Claims Commission to determine the extent of liability for damage by the space objects of one country to the space objects or property of another state.

Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty provides for consultations if any treaty party believes an activity planned by another treaty party would cause "potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space."

Beyond this, the General Assembly could, by majority vote, request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice if either the peaceful-uses language or the extension of the UN Charter to space or these two articles on liability and consultation come into contention, for example, as the space-based component of the missile defense system advances.

In fact, requests for consultation or under Article IX—or also a General Assembly request for an advisory opinion—can come now in order to make world opinion aware of the weaponization issue before the damage has been done, and to make the US government more aware of the potential costs entailed in weaponizing space.

The request for consultation under Article IX can come from any party or group of parties to the Outer Space Treaty. It has been noted that parties to the treaty could convene and issue an interpretation that US testing or orbiting of space weapons was contrary to the peaceful-uses language of the treaty, in effect amending the treaty to preclude weaponization.[1] The General Assembly could pass a resolution endorsing this interpretation.

Other Space Treaties

In addition to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, five other treaties address space issues. These are: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear tests and any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or outer space; the Astronauts Rescue Agreement of 1968, requiring the safe return of astronauts and objects launched into space to their country of origin; the Liability Convention of 1972, establishing procedures for determining the liability of a state that damages or destroys space objects of another state; the Registration Convention of 1976 requiring the registration of objects launched into space; and the Moon Agreement of 1984, which took the first steps to establish a regime for exploiting the natural resources of space.[2] The latter four elaborate on aspects of the Outer Space Treaty.

Treaties Addressing Technical Means of Verification and Missile Defense

The concept of non-interference with national technical means of verification first appeared in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I Treaty of 1972. It was taken over into the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which is of indefinite duration, and into the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), which has been extended to 2009. The intent of this noninterference measure is to preserve from attack or interference technical means of verifying treaty compliance, including space-orbiting means.

It would be a violation of the provisions on noninterference with national means of verification in the INF and START I treaties to use weapons against any early warning, imaging, or intelligence satellite and, by extension, against any ocean surveillance, signals, intelligence, or communications satellite of the United States or Russia. This obligation was made multilateral in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which has 30 NATO and East European participants and is of unlimited duration.

Presumably, Russia, France, the European Union as such, or any other state party to the CFE Treaty could also take legal action against moves toward space weaponization, basing its complaint on treaty provisions prohibiting interference with national technical means of verification. Legal action could also be taken in US courts by foreign or US commercial users of space satellites if these satellites were endangered or destroyed by US space weapons.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty temporarily provided a prohibition against the testing or deploying of weapons in space (other than weapons of mass destruction). The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty became effective on June 13, 2002, rendering the prohibition null.

UN Resolutions

The UN General Assembly has passed resolutions each year for the past 22 years calling for the continued peaceful use of space and the prevention of an arms race in space. The resolution asks all states to refrain from actions contrary to the peaceful use of outer space and calls for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on a multilateral agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space. Most of these resolutions have been unanimous and without opposition, although the United States and a few other governments have abstained. In the most recent version, adopted by the First Committee of the General Assembly in November 2002, there were 151 votes for the resolution with zero opposed. The US and Israel abstained, and 38 permanent representatives were absent from the First Committee.

These repeated, nearly unanimous resolutions—against which the United States does not find it expedient to vote—not only demonstrate the existence of a norm against the weaponization of space. They also indicate a widespread desire to expand existing multilateral agreements to include an explicit prohibition against all weapons in space.

Beyond this, there are five relevant General Assembly resolutions. They are: the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (1963), which preceded the Outer Space Treaty and laid out most of its content; the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Use and Benefit and in the Interest of All States (1996); and resolutions on Direct Television Broadcasting, Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (which seeks to ensure affordable access by developing countries to non-military satellite imaging), and the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space (which deals with limiting exposure in the crash landing of nuclear-powered satellites and the liability for such accidents).3

Other international instruments are pertinent to space. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) allocates radio frequencies used by satellites. It would be difficult for any one country to operate satellites without coordinating their efforts through the ITU. This encourages state cooperation and also provides a locus of influence should the United States or another state pursue behaviors, such as the deployment of space weapons, that are dangerous for other states.

Expansion of the Legal Regime

There have been many proposals to fill the gap in the Outer Space Treaty's prohibition of weapons. Canada and many NGOs have made proposals. The most recent suggestion is a Russia-China working paper presented to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) on June 27, 2002, which contains possible elements of an international legal agreement on prohibiting the deployment of any weapons in outer space. It would also prohibit the threat or use of force against space objects, a concept that would ban anti-satellite weapons, either mounted on aircraft or ground-based.

At present, there is no prospect that this treaty outline will make progress at the CD, owing to the conference rule of consensus decisions and the outright opposition of the United States.

The United States has said it is willing to discuss this issue at the CD, but not to negotiate a treaty on it. China had long insisted that, in addition to discussion, the possibility of negotiation must be mentioned in the agenda, however in August, 2003, China signaled it was prepared to compromise on this point.4 There is even some agitation to change the consensus rules of the Conference on Disarmament. In the meantime, the Russian-Chinese draft can be refined further and developed into a usable treaty text, with help from other governments and NGOs.

Repercussions from violating space law, such as lawsuits and international legal actions, should be included in the calculation of gains and losses from weaponization.

Notes

1. George Bunn and John Rhinelander, June 2002 letter to the editor in Arms Control Today : see http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_06/letterjune02.asp.

2. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Rescue Agreement"), opened for signature on 22 April 1968, entered into force on 3 December 1968, 87 ratifications; The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the "Liability Convention"), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September 1972, 81 ratifications; The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Registration Convention") opened for signature on 14 January 1975, entered into force on 15 September 1976, 43 ratifications); The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Moon Agreement"), opened for signature on 18 December 1979, entered into force on 11 July 1984, 9 ratifications (As of 1 February 2001).

3. The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963); The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (resolution 37/92 of 10 December 1982); The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (resolution 41/65 of 3 December 1986); The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (resolution 47/68 of 14 December 1992); The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996).