International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities

http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Resources/Factsheets/ICOCDraft_31March2014.pdf

VERSION 31 March 2014

DRAFT

International Code of Conduct

for Outer Space Activities

Preamble

The Subscribing States

1 • In order to safeguard the continued peaceful and sustainable use of outer space

for current and future generations, and in a spirit of greater international

cooperation, collaboration, openness and transparency;

2 • Considering that the activities of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful

purposes play a key role in the social, economic, scientific and technological

development of all nations, in the management of global issues such as the

preservation of the environment and disaster management;

3 • Further recognising that space activities and capabilities, including associated

ground and space segments and supporting links, are vital to national security

and to the maintenance of international peace and security;

4 • Noting that all States, both space-faring and non-spacefaring, should actively

contribute to the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation

relating to these activities;

5 • Recognising the need for the widest possible adherence to relevant existing

international instruments that promote the peaceful exploration and use of outer

space;

6 • Noting the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7 • Recalling the increasing importance of outer space transparency and confidence-

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building measures in light of the growing use of outer space by governmental

and non-governmental entities;

8 • Taking into account that space debris affects the sustainable use of outer space,

constitutes a hazard to outer space activities and potentially limits the effective

deployment and utilisation of associated outer space capabilities; 

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(hereinafter referred to as the "Code"):

17 I. Purpose, Scope and General Principles

18 1. Purpose and Scope

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1.1. The purpose of this Code is to enhance the safety, security, and sustainability of

all outer space activities pertaining to space objects, as well as the space

environment.

20

1.2. This Code addresses outer space activities involving all space objects launched

into Earth orbit or beyond, conducted by a Subscribing State, or jointly with other

States, or by non-governmental entities under the jurisdiction of a Subscribing State,

including those activities conducted within the framework of international

intergovernmental organisations.

21 1.3. This Code establishes transparency and confidence-building measures, with the

aim of enhancing mutual understanding and trust, helping both to prevent

confrontation and foster national, regional and global security and stability, and is

complementary to the international legal framework regulating outer space

activities.

22 1.4. Subscription to this Code is open to all States, on a voluntary basis. This Code

is not legally binding, and is without prejudice to applicable international and

national law.

23 2. General Principles

24 The Subscribing States decide to abide by the following principles:

25

• the freedom for all States, in accordance with international law and obligations,

to access, to explore, and to use outer space for peaceful purposes without

harmful interference, fully respecting the security, safety and integrity of space

objects, and consistent with internationally accepted practices, operating

procedures, technical standards and policies associated with the long-term 

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sustainability of outer space activities, including, inter alia, the safe conduct of

outer space activities;

26 • the responsibility of states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner

inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the

inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defence as recognised in

the Charter of the United Nations;

27 • the responsibility of States to take all appropriate measures and cooperate in

good faith to avoid harmful interference with outer space activitie

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(1972);

35 • the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975);

36 • the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union

and its Radio Regulations, as amended;

37 • the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space

and under Water (1963) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

(1996).

38 (b) Declarations, principles, recommendations and guidelines, including:

39 • International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as adopted by

the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) Resolution 1721 (December

1961);

40 • the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the

Exploration and Use of Outer Space as adopted by UNGA Resolution 1962

(XVIII) (1963);

41 • the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space as

adopted by UNGA Resolution 47/68 (1992) and the Safety Framework for

Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space as endorsed by UNGA

Resolution 64/86 (2010);

42 • the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of

Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into

Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries as adopted by

UNGA Resolution 51/122 (1996);

43 • the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002),

as endorsed in UNGA Resolutions 59/91 (2004), 60/62 (2005), 63/64 (2008),

65/73 (2010) and 67/42 (2012);

44 • the Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International 

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Intergovernmental Organisations in Registering Space Objects as endorsed by

UNGA Resolution 62/101 (2007);

45 • the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as endorsed by UNGA Resolution 62/217 (2007).

46 3.2. The Subscribing States resolve to promote the development of guidelines for

outer space operations within the appropriate international fora, such as the UN

Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Conference on Disarmament,

for the purpose of promoting the safety and security of outer space operations and

the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

47 II. Safety, Security and Sustainability of Outer Space Activities

48 4. Measures on Outer Space Operations and Space Debris Mitigation

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4.1. The Subscribing States resolve to establish and implement policies and

procedures to minimise the risk of accidents in space, collisions between space

objects, or any form of harmful interference with another State’s peaceful

exploration, and use, of outer space.

50

4.2. The Subscribing States resolve, in conducting outer space activities, to:

51 • refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or

destruction, of space objects unless such action is justified:

o by imperative safety considerations, in particular if human life or health

is at risk; or

o in order to reduce the creation of space debris; or

o by the Charter of the United Nations, including the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defence.

and where such exceptional action is necessary, that it be undertaken in a manner so

as to minimise, to the greatest extent practicable, the creation of space debris; 

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52 • take appropriate measures to minimize the risk of collision; and

53 • improve adherence to, and implementation of, International Telecommunication

Union regulations on allocation of radio spectra and space services, and on

addressing harmful radio-frequency interference.

54 4.3. In order to minimise the creation of space debris and to mitigate its impact in

outer space, the Subscribing States resolve to limit, to the greatest extent practicable,

any activities in the conduct of routine space operations, including during the launch

and the entire orbital lifetime of a space object, which may generate long-lived

space debris.

55 4.4. To that purpose, they resolve to adopt and implement, in accordance with their

own internal processes, the appropriate policies and procedures or other effective

measures in order to implement the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the

United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as endorsed by

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217 (2007).

56 III. Cooperation Mechanisms

57 5. Notification of Outer Space Activities

58

5.1. The Subscribing States, guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual

assistance, resolve to notify, in a timely manner, to the greatest extent practicable,

all potentially affected States of any event related to the outer space activities they

are conducting which are relevant for the purposes of this Code, including:

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• scheduled manoeuvres that could pose a risk to the safety of flight of the space

objects of other States;

60 • predicted conjunctions posing an apparent on-orbit collision risk, due to natural

orbital motion, between space objects or between space objects and space

debris;

61 • pre-notification of launch of space objects; 

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62 • collisions, break-ups in orbit, and any other destruction of a space object(s)

which have taken place generating measurable orbital debris;

63 • predicted high-risk re-entry events in which the re-entering space object or

residual material from the re-entering space object potentially could cause

significant damage or radioactive contamination;

64 • malfunctioning of space objects or loss of control that could result in a

significantly increased probability of a high risk re-entry event or a collision

between space objects.

65 5.2. The Subscribing States resolve to provide the notifications on any event related

to the outer space activities described above to all potentially affected States:

66 • through the Central Point of Contact to be established under section 9; or

67 • through diplomatic channels; or

68 • by any other method as may be mutually determined by the Subscribing States.

69 In notifying the Central Point of Contact, the Subscribing States should identify, if

applicable, the potentially affected States.

70 The Central Point of Contact should ensure the timely distribution of the

notifications received.

71 6. Information on Outer Space Activities

72 6.1. The Subscribing States resolve to share, on an annual basis, where available

and appropriate, information with the other Subscribing States on:

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• their space strategies and policies, including those which are security-related, in

all aspects which could affect the safety, security, and sustainability in outer

space;

74 • their major outer space research and space applications programmes;

75 • their space policies and procedures to prevent and minimise the possibility of 

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accidents, collisions or other forms of harmful interference and the creation of

space debris; and

76 • efforts taken in order to promote universal adoption and adherence to legal and

political regulatory instruments concerning outer space activities.

77 6.2. The Subscribing States may also consider providing timely information on outer

space environmental conditions and forecasts collected through their space

situational awareness capabilities, including in particular on natural phenomena that

may pose a hazard to spacecraft, to relevant governmental and non-governmental

entities of other Subscribing States.

78 6.3. Subscribing States, particularly those with relevant space capabilities and with

programmes for the exploration and use of outer space, should contribute to

promoting and fostering international cooperation in outer space activities, giving

particular attention to the benefit for and the interests of developing countries. Each

Subscribing State is free to determine the nature of its participation in international

space cooperation on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis with regard to the

legitimate rights and interests of parties concerned, for example, appropriate

technology safeguard arrangements, multilateral commitments and relevant

standards and practices.

79 6.4. The Subscribing States endeavour to organise on a voluntary basis, to the extent

feasible and practicable, and consistent with national and international law, and

obligations, including non-proliferation commitments, activities to familiarize other

Subscribing States with their programs, policies, and procedures related to the

exploration and use of outer space, including:

• familiarisation visits to improve understanding of a State's policies and

procedures for outer space activities;

• expert visits to space launch sites, flight control centres, and other outer space

infrastructure facilities;

• observations of launches of space objects; 

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• demonstrations of rocket and other space-related technologies, in line with

existing multilateral commitments and export control regulations;

• dialogues to clarify information on outer space activities; and

• thematic workshops and conferences on the exploration and use of outer space.

80 7. Consultation Mechanism

81 7.1. Without prejudice to existing consultation mechanisms provided for in Article

IX of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and in the relevant provisions of the ITU

Constitution and Radio Regulations, the Subscribing States resolve to implement the

following consultation mechanism:

82

• A Subscribing State or States that may be directly affected by certain outer space

activities conducted by another Subscribing State or States and has reason to

believe that those activities are, or may be contrary to this Code may request

consultations with a view to achieving mutually acceptable solutions regarding

measures to be adopted in order to prevent or minimise the potential significant

risks of damage to persons or property, or of harmful interference to a

Subscribing State’s outer space activities.

83 • The Subscribing States involved in a consultation process resolve to:

84 o consult through diplomatic channels or by other methods as may be

mutually determined; and

85 o work jointly and cooperatively in a timeframe sufficiently urgent to

mitigate or eliminate the identified risk initially triggering the

consultations.

86 • Any other Subscribing State or States which has or have reason to believe that

its or their outer space activities would be directly affected by the identified risk

may take part in the consultations if it or they request so, with the consent of the

Subscribing State or States which requested consultations and the Subscribing 

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State or States which received the request.

87 • The Subscribing States participating in the consultations resolve to seek

mutually acceptable solutions in accordance with international law.

88 7.2. In addition, Subscribing States may propose to create, on a voluntary and caseby-case

basis, missions to analyse specific incidents affecting space objects, based

on objective information, with a view to draw lessons for the future. These missions,

to be established by consensus by the Meeting of the Subscribing States and carried

out by a geographically representative group of experts, endorsed by the involved

Subscribing States, should utilise information provided on a voluntary basis by the

Subscribing States, subject to applicable laws and regulations. The findings and any

recommendations would be of an advisory nature and could be shared, with the

consent of the Subscribing States involved, with other Subscribing States.

89 IV. Organisational Aspects

90 8. Meeting of Subscribing States

91

8.1. The Subscribing States decide to hold regular meetings annually to define,

review and further develop this Code and facilitate its implementation. Additional

meetings may be held if decided by consensus of the Subscribing States at previous

meetings or as communicated through the Central Point of Contact.

The agenda of such meetings could include:

• review of the implementation of the Code;

• modification of the Code;

• discussion of additional measures which may be necessary, including those due

to advances in the development of space technologies and their application; and

• establishing procedures regarding the exchange of notifications and other

information in the framework of the Code.

92 8.2. The decisions at such meetings, both substantive and procedural, are to be taken

by consensus of the Subscribing States present. Decisions with regard to any 

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modification of the Code taken at such meetings are to apply after written consent is

received by the Central point of Contact via diplomatic note from all Subscribing

States.

93 8.3. At the end of each regular meeting the Subscribing States are to elect by

consensus their Chair for the period until the end of the next regular meeting.

The chair of the first meeting is to be elected at the beginning of this meeting.

94 8.4. The Subscribing States may decide to submit the outcomes of the Meeting of

Subscribing States to the attention of relevant international fora including the United

Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the

Conference on Disarmament, according to their rules of procedure.

95 9. Central Point of Contact

96 9.1. A Central Point of Contact is to be designated by the Subscribing States at the

first Meeting of the Subscribing States and tasked with:

97

• receiving and communicating notifications that a State subscribes to the Code;

98 • serving as a mechanism to facilitate communication of information exchanged

under the Code to all Subscribing States;

99 • serving as secretariat at the Meetings of Subscribing States;

100 • maintaining an electronic database and communications system;

101 • exercising organisational functions in connection with the preparation and

implementation of familiarisation activities referred to in section 6.4., if and to

the extent requested by Subscribing States involved; and

102 • carrying out other tasks as decided by the Meeting of the Subscribing States.

103 9.2. The Subscribing States resolve to create an electronic database and

communications system, which would be used to:

104 • collect and disseminate notifications and information submitted in accordance 

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with this Code; and

105 • serve as a mechanism to channel requests for consultations.

106 9.3. The electronic database is to be used exclusively in the interests of the

Subscribing States.

107 9.4. In implementing the Code of Conduct, the Subscribing States and the Central

Point of Contact shall endeavour to make the best use of existing facilities and

available services.

108 10. Participation by Regional Integration Organisations and International

Intergovernmental Organisations

109 In this Code, references to Subscribing States are intended to apply, upon their

subscription to the Code:

110

• To any regional integration organisation which has competences over matters

covered by this Code, without prejudice to the competences of its member

States.

111 • With the exception of Sections 8.2 and 8.3: To any international

intergovernmental organisation which conducts outer space activities

if a majority of the States members of the organisation are Subscribing States to

this Code.

THE NEW U.S. APPROACH TO THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY: WILL DELETION OF A VERIFICATION REGIME PROVIDE A WAY OUT OF THE WILDERNESS?

THE NEW U.S. APPROACH TO THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY: WILL DELETION OF A VERIFICATION REGIME PROVIDE A WAY OUT OF THE WILDERNESS?

https://www.jlab.org/conferences/doecaa/talks/Jonas.pdf

this is illegal,

Nuclear proliferation and the concomitant potential for nuclear terrorism, is the greatest threat to the United States in the twenty-first century (actually it to the whole world, and the threat is coming mainly from america not to it). President Kennedy’s remarks, prescient as they were, did not foresee the threat from non-state actors and their quest for nuclear weapons. America (the world), must do all it can to prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear capability. (and illegitimate governments and private corporations) Unfortunately, the United States has no choice in the matter. (lies, we always have  choice), Indeed, as Leon Trotsky once said, “you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Potential terrorist acquisition of nuclear capability, confounds a guiding principle of international relations since the Peace of Westphalia, roughly four hundred years ago, when the nation-state system emerged in Europe. The principle is that only another state, with its power of vast armies and navies, could threaten or harm another state. Today, a few terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon, or other weapons of mass destruction, (WMD supplied by shady government agencies), can pose a threat equal to or greater than the military might, a sovereign state can summon. No other device can compare to the power of a nuclear weapon, to inflict unfathomable destruction. Other WMD, such as chemical or biological weapons, horrific as they are, seem less threatening by comparison. All WMD can destroy human life, livestock and animal life, and crops. But only nuclear weapons also destroy buildings and physical infrastructure, and do so on a vast scale  :(

SPACE SECURITY 2003

SPACE SECURITY 2003

this is written by an american DOD specialist and pretty much most of the things in this pdf are illegal see page 169 for how they plant to get around the treaties, by claiming they are anti satellite devices 

http://spacesecurityindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SSI2003.pdf

Published in Washington, DC © The Eisenhower Institute 2004

SBSWs devoted to ballistic missile defense missions will likely rely upon satellites deployed in GEO to provide target information and early warning of ballistic missile launches.

Mass-to-target SBSWs would cause damage by colliding with targets with the combined mass and velocity of the space-based weapon itself or by impacting targets with inert or explosive devices.

SBSW development could potentially legitimate attacks on space assets and encourage the development of anti-satellite weapons.

Energy-to-target SBSWs cause damage by transferring energy through a beam focused on a target. This could include, for example, space-based lasers, microwaves, or neutral particle beams.

Space based strike weapons (SBSWs) would operate from earth orbit with the capability to damage terrestrial targets (land, sea, or air) or terrestrially launched objects passing through space, via the projection of mass or energy.

International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons

International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons

https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/international-legal-agreements#.WrkjqIjwZPY

The military utility of space has long been recognized and exploited. In fact, the reconnaissance, navigation, and communications functions of space assets are critical to war-making and peacekeeping missions of the US military. However, states have so far resisted positioning destructive weapons in space or intentionally destroying the space assets of other states. Recent policy and planning documents of the United States suggest that strategic control of space is a priority of the current administration and that anti-satellite weapons are an important component of this plan. Also, the administration's national missile defense (NMD) agenda includes space-based NMD systems, which will likely be useful ASAT systems as well.

Strong and almost unanimous opposition to weaponization of space has been expressed in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. China and Russia have drafted text for a treaty to ban space weapons. The United States, however, has refused to enter negotiations on such a treaty.

It is likely that the weaponization of space will begin in the foreseeable future unless it is hindered by organized, effective international opposition or the current US administration is replaced by an administration willing to cancel projects for weaponization of space in the face of considerable opposition from domestic proponents of weaponization.

Although no comprehensive treaty about space weapons is in effect, a legal framework does exist. To help frame this opposition, we review relevant international treaties that address aspects of the space weapons issue and discuss relevant United Nations resolutions.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty entered into effect in October 1967. It is the second "nonarmament" treaty (the first being the Antarctic Treaty of 1961). There is no expiration date.

The first three articles of the treaty set general principles for the use of space; the rest of the articles are intended to guide the behavior of treaty parties.

Article I

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.

Article II

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

Article III

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It also prohibits the testing and the deployment of any kind of weapon on the moon or other celestial bodies.

Article IV

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

While Article IV bans WMD from orbit, it does not prohibit missile-borne WMD from transiting space or weapons other than WMD being placed in space orbit and used to attack targets in space or on Earth. There is no ban on air-, ground-, or conventional space-based anti-satellite or anti-missile weapons.

Article VI touches on the important point that States Parties to the Treaty are responsible for the national activities carried out by corporations and any other non-governmental agencies of that nation. In the context of the potential weaponization of space, Article VI provides a legal context within which actions may be challenged if they are perceived by other States Parties to the Treaty as non-peaceful uses of space.

Articles VII and IX also present possibilities for legal action in connection with space weaponization.

Article VII makes treaty parties that launch objects into outer space liable for damage to the property of another treaty party; the procedure is spelled out in the Liability Convention of 1972. The Liability Convention foresees the establishment of a Claims Commission to determine the extent of liability for damage by the space objects of one country to the space objects or property of another state.

Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty provides for consultations if any treaty party believes an activity planned by another treaty party would cause "potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space."

Beyond this, the General Assembly could, by majority vote, request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice if either the peaceful-uses language or the extension of the UN Charter to space or these two articles on liability and consultation come into contention, for example, as the space-based component of the missile defense system advances.

In fact, requests for consultation or under Article IX—or also a General Assembly request for an advisory opinion—can come now in order to make world opinion aware of the weaponization issue before the damage has been done, and to make the US government more aware of the potential costs entailed in weaponizing space.

The request for consultation under Article IX can come from any party or group of parties to the Outer Space Treaty. It has been noted that parties to the treaty could convene and issue an interpretation that US testing or orbiting of space weapons was contrary to the peaceful-uses language of the treaty, in effect amending the treaty to preclude weaponization.[1] The General Assembly could pass a resolution endorsing this interpretation.

Other Space Treaties

In addition to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, five other treaties address space issues. These are: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear tests and any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or outer space; the Astronauts Rescue Agreement of 1968, requiring the safe return of astronauts and objects launched into space to their country of origin; the Liability Convention of 1972, establishing procedures for determining the liability of a state that damages or destroys space objects of another state; the Registration Convention of 1976 requiring the registration of objects launched into space; and the Moon Agreement of 1984, which took the first steps to establish a regime for exploiting the natural resources of space.[2] The latter four elaborate on aspects of the Outer Space Treaty.

Treaties Addressing Technical Means of Verification and Missile Defense

The concept of non-interference with national technical means of verification first appeared in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I Treaty of 1972. It was taken over into the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which is of indefinite duration, and into the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), which has been extended to 2009. The intent of this noninterference measure is to preserve from attack or interference technical means of verifying treaty compliance, including space-orbiting means.

It would be a violation of the provisions on noninterference with national means of verification in the INF and START I treaties to use weapons against any early warning, imaging, or intelligence satellite and, by extension, against any ocean surveillance, signals, intelligence, or communications satellite of the United States or Russia. This obligation was made multilateral in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which has 30 NATO and East European participants and is of unlimited duration.

Presumably, Russia, France, the European Union as such, or any other state party to the CFE Treaty could also take legal action against moves toward space weaponization, basing its complaint on treaty provisions prohibiting interference with national technical means of verification. Legal action could also be taken in US courts by foreign or US commercial users of space satellites if these satellites were endangered or destroyed by US space weapons.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty temporarily provided a prohibition against the testing or deploying of weapons in space (other than weapons of mass destruction). The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty became effective on June 13, 2002, rendering the prohibition null.

UN Resolutions

The UN General Assembly has passed resolutions each year for the past 22 years calling for the continued peaceful use of space and the prevention of an arms race in space. The resolution asks all states to refrain from actions contrary to the peaceful use of outer space and calls for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on a multilateral agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space. Most of these resolutions have been unanimous and without opposition, although the United States and a few other governments have abstained. In the most recent version, adopted by the First Committee of the General Assembly in November 2002, there were 151 votes for the resolution with zero opposed. The US and Israel abstained, and 38 permanent representatives were absent from the First Committee.

These repeated, nearly unanimous resolutions—against which the United States does not find it expedient to vote—not only demonstrate the existence of a norm against the weaponization of space. They also indicate a widespread desire to expand existing multilateral agreements to include an explicit prohibition against all weapons in space.

Beyond this, there are five relevant General Assembly resolutions. They are: the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (1963), which preceded the Outer Space Treaty and laid out most of its content; the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Use and Benefit and in the Interest of All States (1996); and resolutions on Direct Television Broadcasting, Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (which seeks to ensure affordable access by developing countries to non-military satellite imaging), and the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space (which deals with limiting exposure in the crash landing of nuclear-powered satellites and the liability for such accidents).3

Other international instruments are pertinent to space. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) allocates radio frequencies used by satellites. It would be difficult for any one country to operate satellites without coordinating their efforts through the ITU. This encourages state cooperation and also provides a locus of influence should the United States or another state pursue behaviors, such as the deployment of space weapons, that are dangerous for other states.

Expansion of the Legal Regime

There have been many proposals to fill the gap in the Outer Space Treaty's prohibition of weapons. Canada and many NGOs have made proposals. The most recent suggestion is a Russia-China working paper presented to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) on June 27, 2002, which contains possible elements of an international legal agreement on prohibiting the deployment of any weapons in outer space. It would also prohibit the threat or use of force against space objects, a concept that would ban anti-satellite weapons, either mounted on aircraft or ground-based.

At present, there is no prospect that this treaty outline will make progress at the CD, owing to the conference rule of consensus decisions and the outright opposition of the United States.

The United States has said it is willing to discuss this issue at the CD, but not to negotiate a treaty on it. China had long insisted that, in addition to discussion, the possibility of negotiation must be mentioned in the agenda, however in August, 2003, China signaled it was prepared to compromise on this point.4 There is even some agitation to change the consensus rules of the Conference on Disarmament. In the meantime, the Russian-Chinese draft can be refined further and developed into a usable treaty text, with help from other governments and NGOs.

Repercussions from violating space law, such as lawsuits and international legal actions, should be included in the calculation of gains and losses from weaponization.

Notes

1. George Bunn and John Rhinelander, June 2002 letter to the editor in Arms Control Today : see http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_06/letterjune02.asp.

2. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Rescue Agreement"), opened for signature on 22 April 1968, entered into force on 3 December 1968, 87 ratifications; The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the "Liability Convention"), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September 1972, 81 ratifications; The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Registration Convention") opened for signature on 14 January 1975, entered into force on 15 September 1976, 43 ratifications); The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Moon Agreement"), opened for signature on 18 December 1979, entered into force on 11 July 1984, 9 ratifications (As of 1 February 2001).

3. The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963); The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (resolution 37/92 of 10 December 1982); The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (resolution 41/65 of 3 December 1986); The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (resolution 47/68 of 14 December 1992); The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996).

PROPOSED PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE (PAROS) TREATY

PROPOSED PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE (PAROS) TREATY

http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/

The Outer Space Treaty, formally the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a treaty that forms the basis of international space law
In 1959, the UN General Assembly established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in Resolution 1472 (XIV). This committee identified areas for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, devised programs to be undertaken by the United Nations, encouraged research on matters relating to outer space, and studied legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space.
During the 1960s and 1970s a number of agreements were adopted to prevent the weaponization of outer space. These include the Partial Test Ban Treaty, formally titled the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), the Outer Space Treaty, formally titled the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Rescue Agreement, formally titled the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "Intelsat" (1971), the Liability Convention, formally titled the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), the Launch Registration Convention, formally titled the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), the Moon Agreement, formally entitled the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979).
Although these treaties ban the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space, they do not prevent states from placing other types of weapons in space. As a result, many states argue that existing treaties are insufficient for safeguarding outer space as “the common heritage of mankind.” In order to address this, the final document of the UN General Assembly’s Special Session on Disarmament mandated that negotiations should take place in what is now the Conference on Disarmament (CD), “in order to prevent an arms race in outer space” that are “held in accordance with the spirit of the [Outer Space Treaty].”
In 1985 the CD established an ad hoc committee to identify and examine issues relevant to PAROS such as the legal protection of satellites, nuclear power systems in space, and various confidence-building measures. The United States resolutely opposed giving the committee a negotiating mandate, preferring bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. The committee convened each year through 1994. No further committee meeting occurred due to objections made by the United States. In 1990 the United States stated that it “has not identified any practical outer space arms control measures that can be dealt within a multilateral environment.” With its large missile defense program and technical advantages in potential space weaponry, the United States has consistently refused to negotiate PAROS in the CD.
Obligations
Under the draft treaty submitted to the CD by Russia in 2008, State Parties would commit to refrain from placing objects carrying any type of weapon into orbit, installing weapons on celestial bodies, and threatening to use force against objects in outer space. State Parties would also agree to practice agreed confidence-building measures.
A PAROS treaty would complement and reaffirm the importance of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which aims to preserve space for peaceful uses by prohibiting the use of space weapons, the development of space-weapon technology, and technology related to “missile defense.” The treaty would prevent any nation from gaining a military advantage in outer space.
Compliance
When disputes arise between State Parties, they will first attempt to settle through negotiation and cooperation. If this fails, the situation may be referred to the executive organization of the treaty.
Developments
2017
On June 16, the EU Member States issued a statement to the Conference on Disarmament Working Group on the “Way Ahead” that proposed a multilateral non-legally binding instrument on Space Security.
2016
On 26 January, the Conference on Disarmament adopted an agenda for the 2016 session.
On 4 April, the Russian Federation and Venezuela released a joint statement to the Conference on Disarmament declaring that they will not be the first to deploy any type of weapon in outer space.
On 3 June Malaysia submitted a working paper on behalf of the Member States of G-21 on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
On 16 September, the United States of America submitted the following report to the Conference on Disarmament: “Implementing the Recommendations of the Report (A/68/189*) of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in outer space Activities to Enhance Stability in Outer Space.”
2015
On 19 January, the Conference on Disarmament officially began and concluded Part 3 on 18 September. The fourth Panel dealt directly with the Prevention of an arms race in outer space. On 20 January, H.E. Mr. Henk Cor van der Kwast issued a statement on behalf of the Netherlands, encouraging more work on confidence building and transparency in PAROS. On 19 March, Ms. Gabrielle Irsten issued a statement on behalf of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) describing the importance of civil society being active in the pursuit of multilateral space security. On 13 August, Indonesia submitted a working paper on behalf of G-21stressing the importance of space security in a technologically dependent society.
On 27-31 July, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) organized Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Mr. Jacek Bylica, Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, European External Action Service, delivered an opening statement. Participants discussed principles and implementation of the International Code.
On 7 December the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 70/27 on the no first placement of weapons in outer space.
2014
On 27-28 May, EU delegates met in Luxembourg for a third round of open-ended consultations concerning the proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, the fifth draft of which was published on 31 March.
On 10 June, Russia introduced to the Conference on Disarmament an updated draft of its working paper with China, “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).” Relevant changes include the omission of the definition of “outer space,” amendments to other definitions and adjustments to Article IV on the right to self-defense.
On 4 December, the UN passed a Russian draft resolution on banning arms race in outer space was adopted during the assembly's 69th session with 126 votes in favor and 4 votes against. Georgia, Israel, Ukraine and the US were the four countries that opposed the draft resolution.
2013
On 14 January the General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/113 "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” The resolution reaffirmed the importance of international cooperation in developing the rule of law for space, noted the concern regarding a possible arms race, and advised that States with major space capabilities should actively contribute to the goal of preventing an arms race.
On 11 February in the Conference on Disarmament, a working body was established entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" in order to discuss substantively and without limitation all issues related to an arms race in space. The Working Group will be chaired by the Ambassador of Kazakhstan, Mr. Mukhtar Tileuberdi.
On 19 March the CD discussed outer space security generally, and also discussed the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects.
On 1-5 April, the GGE (Group of Governmental Experts) met for the second session in Geneva. Experts from 15 countries contributed to the final output of the Group. The experts agreed on a set of substantive TCBMs for outer space activities and recommended that States consider and implement them. Furthermore, the Group took stock of numerous proposals from governments and changes in the political and technological environment. On 4 June, the Cuban delegation made a statement to the CD stressing that the Cuban delegation was prepared to start negotiating a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
From 8-12 July, the GGE held its third and final session in New York. The final report of the Group’s work was submitted to the General Assembly at its 68th Session: (A/RES/68/189).
On 3 September, Bangladesh made a statement on behalf of the Member States of the G-21 on PAROS. In the statement, the Group emphasized the need for space technology due to it being indispensable to everyday life. Furthermore, the Group also stressed the growing use of outer space and the need for transparency, confidence building measures, and better information on the part of the international community. Finally, the Group welcomed the joint Russian-Chinese initiative of a draft treaty on the “Prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects.”
On 22 October, Ambassador Victor Vasiliev presented a statement as Chairman on behalf of the GGE on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. The Group had a few recommendations and conclusion:
Encouraged States to review and implement the TCBMs through relevant national mechanisms.
Recommended that the General Assembly decides how to further advance TCBMs in Outer Space.
Recommended universal participation in and adherence to the exiting legal framework relating to outer space activities.
Responses to the GGE were provided by a few states. The European Union welcomed the study and report of the GGE and stressed the importance of transparency and confidence building measures, including promoting international cooperation in exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Delegations from the Arab Group and NAM highlighted that proliferating weapons in outer space should be prevented.
Two resolutions came out of the General Assembly session. A/C.1/68/L.40 is entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.” This resolution is to inform states to review and implement the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures. A/C.1/68/L.41 is entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space.” This resolution is the same resolution as last year.
2012
On 31 January, Russia reminded the CD of the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space which Russia and China had proposed in 2008. Russia stressed the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures in this treaty, noting that the Governmental Group of Experts would begin work on this issue later in the year.
From 19-30 March, the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held its fifty-first session in Vienna. The committee report emphasized that the Outer Space Treaty did not adequately prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in outer space and called for a dialogue between the Legal Subcommittee and the CD to address this.
On 5 June the CD discussed PAROS. Belarus, China, Iran, and Pakistan noted the gaps in the existing legal framework and Russia, China, and Pakistan each stated that PAROS is their delegation’s priority at the CD. The EU suggested that the 2008 draft resolution proposed by Russia and China on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space needed greater specifics in order to be effective. Russia, the Republic of Korea, and India all noted that while transparency and confidence-building measures were important, they were not an adequate replacement for legally binding measures. France, the United States, Russia, and the Republic of Korea all spoke in favor of the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space.
On 23-27 July the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence building measures in outer space activities met at the UN headquarters in New York City. Among the many topics discussed was PAROS, Several states indicated that they viewed transparency and confidence building measures as stepping stones to negotiating PAROS.
On August 29 Russian Federation Council speaker Valentina Matviyenko issued a statement on provisions Russia considers mandatory for future talks on reducing strategic arms saying, "Concerns further process of nuclear disarmament by all nuclear states and their step by step joining the efforts taken by Russia and the United States and prevention of an arms race in outer space."
On 30 August the Syria Arab Republic submitted a working paper on behalf of the Group of 21. The Group reiterated its support of preventing and arms race and stated there concern over the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.
2011
In January, three resolutions related to outer space were passed by the UN General Assembly. Resolution 65/97, adopted without a vote, addressed international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, encouraging all states to become parties to relevant international treaties. Resolution 65/68 called for greater transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and passed with a vote of 183 in favor, none against, and one abstention (the United States), while Resolution 65/44 encouraged states to continue efforts to assure the prevention of an arms race in outer space and passed with a vote of 178 in favor, none against, and two abstentions (Israel and the United States).
On 4 February the United States released its National Security Space Strategy, which emphasized the need for the responsible use of outer space and greater international cooperation. Other key points included strengthening international norms, using a multilayered deterrence approach and enhancing overall national space capacity.
On 8 February, the CD addressed the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including a presentation of the EU draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, which would provide guidelines to limit harmful interference, collision, or accidents in outer space. China and Russia highlighted a draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space presented by them in 2008. The CD returned to the discussion on 8 March with states calling for the creation of a legally binding treaty on PAROS and discussed verification issues.
From 28 March to 8 April, the UN Legal Subcommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held its 50th session. At the meetings, delegates expressed concerns about “present gaps” within the legal regime on outer space and advocated for a “more comprehensive legal regime to prevent militarization in outer space.”
On 7 April, China issued a statement titled “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” noting that the weaponization of outer space “is against the interests of all countries.”
From 1 to 11 June, the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held its 54th session. The meeting focused on several issues, including satellite data usage for natural disasters, space debris, and climate change in relation to space. Also, delegates from Canada (in conjunction with the Space Security Index) issued a presentation discussing current trends in the militarization of space, specifically in terms of reconnaissance, surveillance, navigations, and intelligence operations. The delegation emphasized that despite the military activities, “no space-based Space Weapons have been used to date.”
On 13 September, Nigeria presented working paper CD/1965 entitled “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” to the CD on behalf of the G-21. The working paper noted that existing legal instruments were inadequate to deter further militarization of space and recommended the draft treaty on the “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” proposed by Russia and China in 2008 as a starting point for a PAROS treaty.
On 12 October, Sri Lanka presented draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.14 to the UNGA First Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The draft resolution emphasized the need for verification measures to prevent an arms race and reaffirmed the CD’s role as the primary body for negotiating and drafting a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was adopted on 26 October by a vote of 171 in favor, none against, and two abstentions. On 2 December 2011, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 66/27 on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
2010
From 18 January to 26 March, many delegations made statements that supported the PAROS treaty in the CD. Australia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan welcomed and supported the draft treaty submitted by Russia and China in 2008. The Russian delegation reiterated the need to move toward the implementation for the draft treaty. The delegations of Bangladesh, the European Union, Ireland, Libya, Republic of Korea, Romania, and Switzerland also made positive reference to the PAROS treaty during their statements. The United States delegation’s statements did not reference the PAROS treaty.
On 1 April the United Kingdom launched its new Space Agency, designed to provide a single voice on space issues for the United Kingdom as well as coordinate, develop and promote space activities within the United Kingdom.
On 28 June the United States published a new outer space policy, which emphasized states’ right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes including national security activities.
On 6 July the CD discussed PAROS again, where the Group of 21 called for the negotiation of a treaty related to PAROS within the CD and welcomed a draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space tabled by China and Russia in 2008. Discussion of PAROS continued on 13 July with a presentation by the United States of their new outer space policy.
On 26 November the European Union held the Seventh Space Council, which called for the creation of a comprehensive space strategy for the EU and discussed best practices in order to implement the Galileo and Global Monitoring for Environment and Security projects.
2009
On 26 March, Canada introduced a paper to the CD entitled “The Merits of Certain Draft Transparency and Confidence Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for Space Security.”
On 28 October, the CD adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.25 entitled “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.” The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 176 in favor, none against, and two abstentions (the United States and Israel). This resolution had previously been blocked by the United States, which had voted against it since 2005. With Israel maintaining its abstention from previous years and the United States switching its vote to an abstention some progress was able to be made. The following day the CD adopted A/C.1/64/L.40, entitled “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities,” without a vote. For the first time in a decade, the CD reached agreement on a program of work. In their program, a working group was established for the “prevention of an arms race in outer space” in order to discuss “all issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Unfortunately, no progress occurred due to the inability of the CD to implement its program of work for the year.
2008
On 12 February, China and Russia introduced a Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to the CD. The United States dismissed this proposal characterizing the offer as “a diplomatic ploy by the two nations to gain a military advantage.”
On 20 February, the United States shot down a failed spy satellite that was carrying approximately a half-ton of hydrazine rocket fuel, a toxic chemical. Many countries criticized this act because the satellite was shot down using a three stage, Standard Missile-3, whose primary purpose is for use as an interceptor for the U.S. Navy’s missile defense system.
In April a working group was formed for PAROS in the CD.
On 10 July, the European Parliament passed a resolution on Space and Security.
On 8 December, the European Union established a Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The European Union introduced this draft code to the CD on 12 February 2009.
2007
On 11 January, the Chinese fired a missile to shoot down one of its own ageing weather satellites. This raised fears in the United States concerning a potential space race. Japan also strongly condemned the test, declaring concern over its national security and the possibility of an arms race in space. Despite condemning the test, the United States continued to pursue several space and missile defense projects, many of which have dual-use capabilities.
On 15 June, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space adopted space debris mitigation guidelines.
Russia again introduced a resolution for transparency and confidence building measures for activities in outer space. In accordance with previous years all voted in favor of the resolution except for the United States (objection) and Israel (abstaining). Russia and China also produced a working paper (CD/1679). This working paper discusses the definitions of concepts such as Outer Space, Space Weapons, Space Objects and the Peaceful Use of Outer Space.
In the UNGA the Secretary General released a report on the “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.” This report discussed the positions of Austria, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Portugal on behalf of the European Union. The European Union proposed the development of a comprehensive code of conduct on objects and activities related to space, and suggested general principles, scope and participation for such a code. On 18 September, this code of conduct was attached to the Secretary General’s report on “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.” (A/62/114/Add.1) In addition, the European Union is planning to submit this code of conduct to the CD. Two resolutions were passed in the UN: A/RES/62/20 on the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” and A/RES/62/43 “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.”
2006
Russia again introduced a resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, which enjoyed substantial support. The United States maintained its objections and Israel continued to abstain from the vote. On 22 May, China and Russia tabled another working paper at the CD that related to the verification aspects of PAROS (CD/1778). This working paper suggested different types of confidence-building measures such as exchanges of information, demonstrations, notifications, consultations and thematic workshops. Two documents were adopted by the UN General Assembly: A/RES/61/58 (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) and A/RES/61/75 (Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities).
2005
On 16 August an open-ended meeting was hosted by China and Russia on issues relating to PAROS. In addition Russia introduced a resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures regarding outer space activities. This resolution enjoyed support from an overwhelming majority, with only Israel abstaining and the United States objecting. The UN General Assembly adopted two documents: A/C.1/60/L.27 (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) and A/C.1/60/L.30/Rev.1 (Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities).
2004
United Nations document A/RES/59/65 “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” was adopted by the General Assembly and distributed December 17.
2003
United Nations document A/RES/58/36 “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” was adopted by the First Committee of the General Assembly.
2002
In spite of a continued deadlock in the CD, certain states, particularly China and Russia, continued to push for negotiations regarding PAROS. A joint working paper on the “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” was submitted by China and Russia.

Conference on Disarmament Geneva, 14-16 June 2017 Working Group on the "Way Ahead" EU Statement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

Conference on Disarmament Geneva, 14-16 June 2017 Working Group on the "Way Ahead" EU Statement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28329/conference-disarmament-working-group-way-ahead-eu-statement-prevention-arms-race-outer-space_en

Proposals for multilateral non-legally binding instruments on Space Security
Mr. Chairman,
At the outset, let me congratulate you on the assumption of the role as co-facilitator and thank you for your efforts to lead us through the substantive discussions on the Agenda item 3 - Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
The European Union and its Member States continue promoting the preservation of a safe and secure space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. The EU recognises the outer space as a global common good, to be used for the benefit of humankind.
The EU and its Member States are increasingly engaged in outer space. The EU has developed two ambitious Space programmes, Galileo and Copernicus, which complement national space programmes and provide services free of charge which can contribute to realising the 2030 Agenda and its sustainable development goals. These two programmes already deliver services that benefit millions of people. Furthermore, European space actors increasingly engage in international cooperation to help other countries mobilise space for sustainable development.
Our new Space Strategy for Europe, issued in October 2016, sets out Europe's ambitions in space and confirms that we remain an active and globally engaged partner to promote and protect the sustainable and peaceful use of outer space by all nations.
Preventing an arms race in outer space and preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict is essential to safeguard the long-term use of the space environment for peaceful purposes.
The growth in amount of human space-activity, coupled with the increased diversity of space operators, also makes it both more complicated and more necessary to develop new norms and rules governing human activity in space.
We remain convinced that transparency and confidence-building measures can make an important contribution to the security, safety and sustainability of activities in outer space. The EU, with its initiative on a Code of Conduct, first proposed in 2008, demonstrated leadership and willingness to work with the international community on space issues. Efforts to pursue political commitments, such as a multilateral code of conduct to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space, are still relevant. It should be recalled that they were also endorsed by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on TCBMs in outer space, which the UN Secretary General set up in 2010 in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 65/80.
In this context, we would like to encourage all States to work together to elaborate common guidelines such as principles of responsible behaviour in outer space, which could complement existing initiatives. Such principles should be designed in a way that they are agreeable by a vast majority of spacefaring nations.
Globally shaped principles of responsible behaviour should address the full range of space activities and related challenges such as space debris, space traffic management, collision avoidance and prevention of an arms race in outer space and should hence serve long term goals: to increase international cooperation in space, to commit mutually to debris mitigation and to non-interference in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, to facilitate an equitable access to outer space and increase transparency in the conduct of space activities.
The EU therefore calls for increased international cooperation in order to establish agreed standards of responsible behaviour in outer space to preserve the integrity of space environment for all. The EU continues to believe that a non-legally binding agreement negotiated within the United Nations could be a way to proceed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Proposals for multilateral legally-binding instruments on Space Security
Mr. Chairman,
As highlighted yesterday, the EU and its Member States attach great importance to the development and implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures as a means of strengthening security and ensuring sustainability in the peaceful use of outer space. In this context, EU Member States voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution 71/42 regarding the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).
The prevention of an arms race in outer space and the need to prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict are essential conditions for the strengthening of strategic stability. It will also allow all States to benefit from peaceful uses of outer space and the many opportunities for development that these can provide.
We remain concerned of the continued development of all anti-satellite weapons and capabilities, including terrestrially based, and underline the importance of addressing such developments promptly and as part of international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.
We maintain reservations regarding the updated draft on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) and reiterate our view that a new legally binding instrument would need to be comprehensive, precise and verifiable.
We are equally concerned that the initiative “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (NFP) does not adequately respond to the objective of strengthening trust and confidence between States. We believe that initiatives aiming to prevent an arms race in outer space should contribute to fostering a climate of mutual trust and transparency between States. The very idea of "not to be the first to place" is ambiguous and may entice States to prepare to be second or third. Moreover, this initiative does not address the difficult issue of defining what a weapon in outer space is, which could easily lead a State to mistakenly assess that another State has placed weapons in outer space.
We believe it is more useful to address the behaviour in, and use of, outer space to further discussions and initiatives on how to prevent space from becoming an arena for conflict while ensuring the long-term sustainability of the space environment. We encourage States to support initiatives to this end, such as the idea to elaborate principles of responsible behavior in outer space (PORBOS), without excluding the possibility that this may one day result in new legally binding norms.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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The League Result's!,

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day 120      (fake-book data)

week 609

month 2,027

fb tracked by Referring Sites, & Referring URLs m.facebook.com l.facebook.com www.facebook.com (unknown total views, as they are shady A.F, total traffic to blogger 46,632)

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(FB true amount see bellow)

day 126

week 655

month 3,536

on blogger blogger.com, https://ediobangers.blogspot.co.uk/ (total views 124,268)

day 414

week  1,862

month 10,537

on google+, https://plus.google.com/+ediobangerz/ (total 45,030)

day 261

week 1,114

month 4644

on ello https://ello.co/edio1 (total 546,400)

day 3500

week 18,800

month 75,200

(all time total  762,321 tracking began on 21 July  2017)

(weekly totals)see below)

day 4301

week 22,431

month 93,917

the world cup

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Your followers

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22

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15

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12

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11

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11

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10

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10

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9

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7

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7

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7

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7

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6

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6

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5

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5

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4

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4

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2

Bosnia & Herzegovina

2

Belarus

2

Chile

2

Czech Republic

2

Finland

2

Indonesia

2

Montenegro

2

Slovakia

2

South Korea

2

Sri Lanka

2

Thailand

2

Algeria

1

Bangladesh

1

Colombia

1

Estonia

1

Iraq

1

Jordan

1

Morocco

1

Romania

1

Tunisia

1

Trinidad and Tobago

1

The Premiership

And thank you all very much, for taking part, and in first place on an amazing 93 points London!, well done, well played crew!, and in second place on superb 65 Wakefield gooo-on ya little beauty!, and in third place on a respectable 30 points Normanton, well played crew well done,  and to all the rest of you, who have fallen, just ever so short, of the glory and fame of the podium finish, don't worry, there's always next time, and your already winner's in my book!!, thank you to everyone who has, and continues to take part, thank you very much, we defo are stronger together, than we can ever be apart!!, You know, we are not as alone as you may think!,

City

Your followers

London, England

93

Wakefield, England

65

Normanton, England

30

Leeds, England

17

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17

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12

Pontefract, England

11

Johannesburg, Gauteng

9

Manila, Philippines

8

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8

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8

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8

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8

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6

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5

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4

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4

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4

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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3

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2

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2

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1

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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2

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1 

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

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1

i want to say, a big thank you, to all of you, for your continued support, you have my love and my gratitude forever as, standardz, hahahahahahaha, :) #edio

i applaud your enthusiasm, but shouldn't you be, weaving a dream of your own, by now, xx ;) #edio